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^©lutien ©f T^gth, 



By SENEX 



THE 

EVOLUTION OF MYTH 

AS EXEMPLIFIED IN 

General Grant's History of the Plot of 

President Polk and Secretary Marcy 

to Sacrifice two American 

Armies in the Mexican 

War of 1846-48. 



BY SENEX, 





WASHINGTON, D. C. 
WIEEIAM H. MORRISON. 

1 890. 
«>5> 



^he Jj^lutien ©f JJP^h 



The Myth. 



In the Personal Memoirs of General Grant, 
volume i, chapter 9, under the heading of " Polit- 
ical Intrigue," are found the following paragraphs: 

' ' The Mexican War was a political war, and 
the administration conducting it desired to make 
political capital out of it. General Scott was at 
the head of the Army, and being a soldier of ac- 
knowledged professional capacity, his claim to the 
command of the forces in the field was almost un- 
disputable, and does not seem to have been denied 
by President Polk, or Marcy his Secretary of War. 
Scott was whig, and the administration was demo- 
cratic. General Scott was also known to have 
political aspirations, a id nothing so popularizes a 
candidate for high nvil position as military vic- 
tories. It would not do therefore to give him com- 
mand of the 'Army of Invasion.' The plans sub- 
mitted by Scott for a campaign in Mexico w T ere 
disapproved by the administration, and he replied 
in a tone, possibly a little disrespectful, to the 
effect that if a soldier's plans were not to be sup- 
ported by the administration, success could not be 
expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. 



4 The Evolution of Myth. 

Four days later he (General Scott) was notified that 
he need not go to Mexico. General Gaines was 
next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take 
the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor a Brigadier 
General by brevet was therefore left in command. 
He too was a whig but was not supposed to enter- 
tain any political aspiration; nor did he; but after 
the fall of Monterey, his third battle and third 
complete victory, the whig papers at home began 
to speak of him as the candidate of their party for 
the presidency. Something had to be done to 
neutralize his growing popularity. He could not 
be relieved from duty in the field where all his 
battles had been victories; the design would have 
been too transparent. It was finally decided to 
send General Scott to Mexico in chief command, 
and to authorize him to carry out his own original 
plan — that is to capture Vera Cruz and march upon 
the capital of the country. It was no doubt sup- 
posed that Scott's ambition would lead him to 
slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the 
presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would 
not make sufficient capital himself to secure the 
prize. 

"The administration had indeed a most em- 
barrassing problem to solve It was engaged in a 
war of conquest which mtte* be carried to a suc- 
cessful issue or the political object would be un- 
attained. Yet all the capable officers of the requi- 
site rank belonged to the opposition, and the man 
selected for his lack of political ambition had him- 
self become a prominent candidate for the presi- 
dency. It was necessary to destroj' his chances 
promptly. The fact is, the administration of Mr. 
Polk made every preparation to disgrace General 



The Evolution of Myth. 5 

Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to 
such desperation that he would disgrace himself. 
General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of 
the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the 
first. Now that he was in command of all the 
forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most 
of his regular troops and left him only enough 
volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in 
possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott 
did not deem it important to hold anything beyond 
the Rio Grande, and authorized Taylor to fall back 
to that line if he chose. Taylor protested against 
the depletion of his army, and his subsequent 
movement upon Buena Vista would indicate that 
he did not share the views of his chief in regard 
to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio 
Grande. 

u Scott had estimated the men and material that 
would be required to capture Vera Cruz and to 
march on the capital of the country, 260 miles 
in the interior. He was promised all he asked, 
and seemed to have not only the confidence of the 
President, but his sincere good wishes. The 
promises were all broken. Only about half the 
troops were furnished that had been pledged, other 
war material was withheld, and Scott had scarcely 
started for Mexico before the President undertook 
to supersede him by the appointment of Senator 
Thomas H. Benton as lieutenant General. This 
being refused by Congress, the President asked 
legislative authority to place a junior over a senior 
of the same grade, with a view of appointing Ben- 
ton to the rank of Major General, and then placing 
him in command of the army; but Congress failed 
to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott re- 



6 The Evolution of Myth. 

mained in command ; but every General appointed 
to serve under him was politically opposed to the 
chief, and several were personally hostile." 

In the next chapter it is said: 

"General Scott had less than 12,000 men at 
Vera Cruz. He had been promised by the admin- 
istration a very much larger force, or claimed that 
he had, and he was a man of veracity." 

And again: 



(< 



It was very important to get the army away 
from Vera Cruz as soon as possible in order to 
avoid the yellow fever or vomito, which usually 
visits that city early in the year and is very fatal 
to persons not acclimated." 



There might be some uncertainty as to what is 
meant by slaughtering Taylor and disgracing Scott, 
if it were not rendered clear by the means used to 
effect these objects. Taylor and Scott were to be 
deprived of half the troops which the one had, 
and the other counted on. This explanation dis- 
pels all ambiguity. For unless it was the purpose 
of the administration to enhance the glory of these 
commanders by forcing them to win great victories 
with small armies, its only purpose must have 
been to have them defeated. In no other way 
could the diminution of his army in the face of 
an advancing enemy destroy Taylor's prospects 



The Evolution of Myth. 7 

for the presidency, or the withholding of rein- 
forcements from Scott, after he had landed at Vera 
Crnz, prevent him from making political capital 
by victory. 

The story of this enormous wickedness, the more 
enormous, that it was planned long in advance and 
involved the destruction of ten thousand men with 
the principal victim who was to be lured to his 
death by hypocritical professions of confidence and 
good wishes, is told with a circumstantiality and 
fullness of detail that to most readers will supply 
the place of proof. And it draws from the narrator 
not a single expression of indignation or even of 
disapproval. 



Mr. Polk had been honored by the direct votes 
of the people of his State and of the whole country, 
with the highest offices, legislative and executive. 
Mr. Marcy had been a Judge of the Supreme Court 
of his State, Governor of the State, Senator of the 
United States, and member of two cabinets, as 
Secretary of War and Secretary of State, and yet, 
says his biographer, his "crowning virtue was his 
incorruptible integrity." These men had lived all 
their lives in the fierce light of political life, and 
had gone to the grave honored and respected by 
all. And twenty years after the death of the last 
survivor we are told by a President of the United 



8 The Evolution of Myth. 

States, that these men had prostituted their high 
offices, had violated their oaths, and had conspired 
the defeat and destruction of the armies which 
they had sent to war in a foreign land, and all to 
advance the interests of their party at home ! 

That such a tale should be told at all is to be 
deplored, not only because it is false, but because, 
though it be false, it will tend powerfully to en- 
courage political depravity. The vulgar villian 
needs no encouragement, or, if he does, will find 
it in the creed of his class, that " they all do it," 
and wants no proof that all men are alike corrupt. 
But those are more numerous who have some re- 
gard for virtue, some belief in disinterested patriot- 
ism, and who might shrink from voting for a 
scheme to plunder the public or from counting 
out an elected candidate, were there not held up 
before their eyes the example of men like Polk 
and Marcy, honored and esteemed, who yet had 
sacrificed conscience, violated duty, and perjured 
their souls for the good of their party. 

And then surely, no more damaging charge was 
ever brought against free institutions than that the 
elect of the people entered into a plot to sacrifice 
the welfare of his country and the lives of ten 
thousand of his fellow-citizens in order to rid him- 
self of a political rival. I venture to say no heredi- 
tary monarch ever did the like; and if a President 
of the United States has done this, he has supplied 



The Evolution of Myth. 9 

an unanswerable argument to those who maintain 
that, according to the experience of all ages and 
all countries, patriotism will never long continue 
to rise superior to the rage of party spirit and the 
allurements of ambition ; and that only a hereditary 
ruler, whose fortunes and those of his children are 
indissolubly bound up with those of his country, 
can be relied on for unswerving devotion to its 
honor and interests. 



Of course the charge is not true — could not be. 
For if Taylor's army had been overwhelmed at 
Buena Vista, or Scott's had perished of vomito 
while unable to get into Vera Cruz for want of a 
siege train, or out of it for want of reinforcements, 
the " war of conquest which must be carried to a 
successful issue" would have failed and the politi- 
cal object have been unattained. A more absurd 
story could not have been invented than that Polk 
and Marcy expected to conquer Mexico with the 
armies of Scott and Taylor, and at the same time 
withhold absolutely necessary reinforcements and 
supplies in order that the two generals should be 
slaughtered or disgraced. In a violent letter 
which General Scott, after the campaign, addressed 
to Governor Marcy (No. 43), he insinuated that he 
had not been properly supported — I shall recur to 
this further on — and the Secretary replied (No. 44), 



to The Evolution of Myth. 

in a few contemptuous sentences which should 
have set the slander forever at rest. "You seek 
(said he to Scott) to create the belief that you were 
drawn from your quiet position in a bureau of this 
department, and assigned to the command of our 
armies in Mexico for the purpose of being sacri- 
ficed; in other words, that the Government, after 
preferring you to any other of the gallant generals 
within the range of its choice, had labored to frus- 
trate its own plans, to bring defeat on its own 
armies, and to involve itself in ruin and disgrace 
for an object so unimportant in its bearing upon 
public affairs. A charge so entirely preposterous, 
so utterly repugnant to all the probabilities of 
human conduct, calls for no refutation." The re- 
vival of the calumny shows that Governor Marcy 
relied too much upon the good sense of the people; 
and I propose now to supply the proof which he 
disdained to offer. 



In entering upon the task of refuting the accusa- 
tion, I am met with the difficulty that no evidence 
whatever has been offered in support of it. In the 
nature of things a negative is impossible of direct 
proof; and the usual method of proving that a thing 
is not so, is by contradicting the evidence that it 
is so. But the charge that Scott was sent out to 
slaughter Taylor is supported only by the affirma- 



The Evolution of Myth. it 

tion that there is " no doubt" of it; and the allega- 
tion that Scott said he had been promised reinforce- 
ments and supplies which were never sent, is not 
supported even by that kind of corroboration. Such 
a mode of fastening a great crime upon respectable 
men surprised me not a little, until, long after this 
article was in hand, I met with the following 
extracts from a panegyric upon General Grant, 
which sheds some light upon his method of dealing 
with truth. 

u To any one who knew much of Grant's pecu- 
liar mental traits it would be quite easily believed 
that when Grant had asserted either matter of fact 
or opinion, he quite naively assumed that the bur- 
den of proof was on him who questioned it. * * 
* * His quiet but undoubting confidence in him- 
self was one of the conditions of his great success. ' ' * 

One great advantage which this peculiar mental 
trait secures to its possessor is, that if the person 
whom he assails happens to be in his grave — as is 
the case in the present instance — the burden of 
proof is very apt to rest where puts it. Neverthe- 
less I feel impelled to undertake the task of vindi- 
cation even with the burden, and am confident I 
shall be able, even thus handicapped, to make my 
case clear. 



* Quoted in Notes on the Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheri- 
dan by Brevet L,t. Col. C. McClellan, page 29. 



12 The My fit in Chrysalis. 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 

The first allegation in order of time is that 
General Taylor was ' c selected for his lack of politi- 
cal ambition ' ' to command the first army in Mexico ; 
the "army of occupation," as it was called. The 
fact is that General Taylor was, when so selected, 
and had been for the five years preceding, stationed 
in Louisiana with a considerable military force, in 
command of the first military department, com- 
prising five Southwestern States ; and he was, by 
perhaps a thousand miles, nearer to the threatened 
frontier than any other department commander 
who could have been spared for the same duty. 
He had also commanded with success in the Black 
Hawk and Seminole wars. But General Grant's 
"quiet but undoubting confidence in himself" 
assures him he knows the true ground of the selec- 
tion, and that it was for political ends. 

It is insinuated that Taylor would have been sus- 
pended after his victories had begun to render him 
formidable in the political field, but that "all the 
capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to 
the opposition." Now, the Army Register for 
1846, page 28, contains a list of general officers, 
twelve in number; in the order of rank, Taylor is 
eleventh on the list. Among these are Jesup, 
Wool, and Worth, all Democrats so far as they had 



The Myth hi Chrysalis. 13 

any politics ; all capable officers, and all of them 
served in the field in the Mexican war. Wool and 
Worth won distinction at the head of troops ; and 
Jesup was at the front as Quartermaster-General. 
He had commanded in the Seminole war, and in 
the Creek troubles in Alabama. Before the Presi- 
dent promoted Taylor over all the brigadiers, 
Jesup and Wool were his seniors, and if either of 
them had been sent to join him with reinforce- 
ments after his first victories, Taylor would have 
been superseded by mere operation of law, and a 
Democrat placed in command. 



Now, let us see what was the course of the Ad- 
ministration toward Taylor. The moment the 
news of his first victories reached Washington the 
President gave him the brevet of major general 
(No. 1) — the highest rank in the Army — and gave 
him the command of all the forces then and there- 
after to be directed against Mexico (No. 3). A 
democratic Congress voted him thanks and a gold 
medal, and created an additional office of major 
general, to which the President forthwith ap- 
pointed him. The President is represented as re- 
fusing to give the command in Mexico to General 
Scott, lest he should make political capital, and 
yet he did his best to enhance the effect of Taylor's 
victories by heaping honors upon him. In addi- 



14 The Mylh in Chrysalis. 

tion, he addressed General Taylor a letter, in terms 
of the most glowing praise, and directed him to 
publish it to the army tinder his command, and 
thus to the whole country (No. i). 

This was on the 30th of May, 1846. Immedi- 
ately thereafter, June 8th (No. 2), the Secretary of 
War consulted him as to the advisability of "strik- 
ing a blow at the city of Mexico, "and asked whether 
it could be reached from the north; and, without 
waiting for a reply, the Secretary on the 9th of 
July (No. 5) suggested it could be best reached by 
way of Vera Cruz, which could be easily captured, 
and from which port, he said, a fine carriage road 
led to the capital. And he asked General Taylor's 
views as to such an expedition. To the first letter 
Taylor replied under date of July 2d (No. 4), and to 
the second letter, under date of August 1st (No. 6). 
He said the city of Mexico could not be reached 
from the north and by land, and with regard to 
the suggested expedition by way of Vera Cruz he 
could give no opinion, either as to its practicability 
or as to the force it would require. ' ' The Depart- 
ment of War" (he said) "must be much better 
informed than" he. But he thought his army 
could reach San Luis Potosi, and had no doubt the 
occupation of that city would bring proposals of 
peace. 

The Secretary of War then proposed, September 
2d (No. 7), to capture Tampico, which General Tay- 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 15 

lor had said * ' would be important to the occupation 
of San Luis Potosi," 150 miles distant, and asked 
General Taylor's views as to that enterprise. This 
letter was intercepted by the enemy and did not 
reach General Taylor. On the 22d of September 
(No. 9), the Secretary wrote that it was proposed 
to take Tampico, and that to save time General 
Patterson (who was on the Rio Grande while Tay- 
lor had advanced far into the interior) would be 
directed to hold himself in readiness to proceed 
immediately unless his withdrawal would interfere 
with General Taylor's operations. In reply, Octo- 
ber 1 2th (No. 10), General Taylor briefly said that 
the attack on Tampico would be contrary to the con- 
vention which he had entered into on the capture 
of Monterey, and by which he had agreed not to 
advance bevond a certain point for eight weeks ; 
and three days later, in a letter dated October 15th 
(No. 11), he entered fully into the subject of an ad- 
vance into the provinces of Tamaulipas and San 
Luis Potosi, which he discouraged, and begged that 
at least his army might not be required to co-oper- 
ate in it just then. Continuing, he said: 

11 It may be expected that I should give my views 
as to the policy of occupying a defensive line, to 
which I have above alluded. I am free to confess 
that in view of the difficulties and expense attend- 
ing a movement into the heart of the country, and 
particularly in view of the unsettled and revolu- 
tionary character of the Mexican Government, the 



1 6 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

occupation of such a line seems to me the best 
course that can be adopted. The line taken might 
either be that on which we propose to insist as the 
boundary between the republics — say the Rio Grande 
— or the line to which we have advanced, viz., the 
Sierra Madre, including Chihuahua and Santa Fe. 
* * * Should the Government determine to 
strike a decisive blow at Mexico, it is my opinion 
that the force should land near Vera Cruz or Alva- 
rado; and after establishing a secure depot, march 
thence on the capital. The amount of troops re- 
quired for this service would not fall short in my 
judgment of 25,000 men, of which at least 10,000 
to be regular troops." 

And then later on he said: 

' ' I feel it due to my position and to the service 
to record my protest against the manner in which 
the Department has sought to make an important 
detachment from my command, specifically indicat- 
ing not only the general officers, but to a consider- 
able extent the troops, that were to compose it. 
While I remain in command of the army against 
Mexico, and am, therefore, justly held responsible 
by the Government and the country for the conduct 
of its operations, I must claim the right of organiz- 
ing all detachments from it, and regulating the 
time and manner of their service. Above all do I 
consider it important that the Department of War 
should refrain from corresponding directly with my 
subordinates, and communicating orders and in- 
structions on points which, by all military precept 
and practice, pertain exclusively to the General in 
chief command," 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 17 

Before this letter could reach Washington, the 
Secretary wrote the General on the 2 2d of October 
(No. 12) that the expedition against Vera Cruz was 
determined on if he could spare the necessary force ; 
and, if so, he might organize it under the com- 
mand of General Patterson. In reply, November 
1 2th, (No. 14) General Taylor thought the capture 
of Vera Cruz should not be attempted with less than 
10,000 men ; 4,000 might probably effect a landing 
and carry the city, but they could do no more and 
might be overpowered by a large force of the enemy. 
After capturing Tampico, for which he was pre- 
paring, he could spare 4,000 men, but the rest must 
come from the States. Tampico was soon after 
captured by the navy alone. 



Now, let us consider the situation. General Tay- 
lor had advanced 125 miles beyond the Rio Grande 
— to Saltillo — and considered it important to hold 
that position. Under the most favorable circum- 
stances an exchange of letters required six weeks ; 
a longer time was usual, and letters were liable to 
be intercepted by the enemy, as they had been 
more than once and their bearers killed. He was 
in command of all the troops everywhere in Mexico, 
and he claimed the right to make all detachments 
from his army, designate the officers to command 
them, and to regulate the time and manner of their 



1 8 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

service. On this he had insisted in his letter of 
October 15th (No. 11), and he repeated it in letters of 
December 14th (No. 21) and December 26th (No. 25). 
The Administration had in September proposed to 
Mexico to open negotiations for peace, and Mexico 
had refused to entertain the proposition (No. 9). 
It was clear that no amount of warring in the re- 
mote and thinly settled provinces would compel 
Mexico to entertain proposals for peace, and that 
an expedition against the capital was of absolute 
necessity. But how could General Taylor direct 
that expedition while he was at such a distance at 
once from the base of supplies and from the scene 
of operations? And then he had never approved 
of the expedition; still less intimated a willingness 
to command it. And indeed, if, as General Grant 
doubted not, General Taylor "looked upon the 
enemy as the aggrieved party," there was good 
reason for his reluctance to advise or to command 
the expedition, or even to have his army engaged 
in it.* 

On the other hand, General Scott was anxious 
for service in the field. In May he had applied for 
the command of Taylor's army — "the principal 
army against Mexico" - then (May 27), "or at any 
better time (the President) may be pleased to des- 
ignate," and on September 12th (No. 8) he had re- 

* General Grant declares that the way in which the war was 
forced upon Mexico was wholly unjustifiable, pp. 54, 55. 






The Myth in Chrysalis. 19 

minded the President of his said application, and 
remarked that he had reason to believe his presence 
at the head of the army in the field, in accordance 
with his rank, was "neither unexpected nor un- 
desired by that gallant and distinguished com- 
mander." Six weeks later he had become a 
convert to the scheme of an expedition to the capi- 
tal via Vera Cruz. In a memoir of October 27th 
(No. 13) he said: "To conquer a peace I am now 
persuaded that we must take the city of Mexico or 
place it in imminent danger of capture, and mainly 
through the city of Vera Cruz." And in a subse- 
quent memoir of November 12th (No. 15) he said: 
"Until recently I had concurred in the opinion of 
others that Mexico might be compelled to propose 
reasonable terms of accommodation by the time we 
had conquered the advantages our arms have now 
obtained. ' ' And in subsequent memoirs of Novem- 
ber 1 6th (No. 16) and 21st (No. 17) he recommended 
the withdrawal of more than half of Taylor's army 
for the expedition of Vera Crnz, and urged its 
practicability. It has been shown above that the 
Department had long before come to a decision on 
the subject, and that the only question was whether 
the requisite force could be had, and that, in turn, 
depended upon the number that Taylor could spare. 
Scott calculated that Taylor would have before 
long 27,500 men under his command; he thought 
14,000 of these could be spared for the Vera Cruz 



20 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

expedition, leaving 13,500 for the advance on San 
Luis Potosi. "To meet this double invasion (he 
said) Mexico must either divide her forces and 
increase our chances of success on both lines, or 
double her forces on one and leave the other com- 
paratively open to our advance. ' ' 

And so ultimately it turned out. Mexico con- 
centrated her forces against Taylor and suffered a 
crushing defeat at Buena Vista; but acting a little 
more vigorously than Scott perhaps expected, Santa 
Anna came upon Taylor before he had received the 
reinforcements which were to make his army up to 
13,500. But in justice to Scott, it must be said, and 
presently will be shown, that he did not intend 
Taylor should advance until he should have re- 
ceived those reinforcements. 



On the 1 8th of November the President, in per- 
son, communicated to General Scott his orders to 
take command of the army in Mexico, which were, 
a few days later, embodied in written instructions 
from the Secretary of War, dated November 23, 
1846 (No. 19). On the same day Scott had handed 
the Secretary a draft of the instructions which he 
desired to be given him by the Department (No. 18), 
which, however, the Department did not adopt. 
In view of the charges I am considering, it may be 
well here to note that in the latter Scott desired to 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 21 

be instructed to organize and conduct an expedition 
against Vera Cruz, and to draw troops from Taylor's 
army, only " taking care to leave with him a suffi- 
cient force to defend Monterey and to keep his line 
of communication open, say, to Camargo and thence 
down the Rio Grande to its mouth." This passage 
shows that he knew he was expected not to endan- 
ger Taylor; and I will anticipate the course of my 
narrative to say that six weeks after Scott left 
Washington the Secretary, hearing disquieting ru- 
mors respecting the concentration of a Mexican 
force in Taylor's front, wrote General Scott, under 
date of January 4, 1847 (No. 29), communicating 
his anxiety and making all the suggestions a civil- 
ian could make on such a subject. Among these 
was an opinion that Taylor ought not to extend his 
line to Saltillo, in which Scott concurred and so 
wrote to Taylor January 26th (No. 32). Again, on 
the 2 2d of March, the Secretary, having heard of 
Santa Anna's advance, but not yet of his defeat, 
wrote to General Scott (No. 37) of his anxiety, and 
urged him to provide for Taylor's safety even, if 
necessary, by sending back troops from Vera Cruz. 
I think these extracts will convince every fair- 
minded man that Governor Marcy, so far from de- 
siring that General Taylor should be slaughtered, 
was doing all he could do to secure his safety. I 
proceed now to speak of Scott's conduct towards 
Taylor. 



22 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

LeavingWashington November 23d General Scott 
repaired to New York, whence he addressed a con- 
fidential letter to Taylor, dated November 25th (No. 
20), in which he stated his expectation of being by 
the 23d of December at Camargo on the Rio Grande 
("within easy corresponding distance of you"), 
and suggested that they might later on meet 
"somewhere in the interior of Mexico." He re- 
gretted he should have to reduce Taylor temporarily 
to the necessity of standing on the defensive ; his 
own expedition could not be delayed, because he 
must take Vera Cruz before the yellow fever season 
set in. But more volunteers had been called for; 
Congress had been asked for more regulars, "and 
long before the spring (March) it is probable you 
will be in a condition to resume offensive opera- 
tions. ' ' To this letter Taylor replied in one marked 
unofficial (No. 25), in which he said "at all times 
and places I shall be happy to receive your orders, 
and to hold myself and troops at your disposition." 
From New Orleans, and again on arriving at Ca- 
margo, where Scott found that Taylor was at 
Victoria, some 200 miles to the south, he addressed 
Taylor letters under dates of December 20, 1846 
(No. 22), and January 3, 1847 (No. 27), in which 
he explained more fully his plans, and in the last, 
repeated that Taylor would be ' ' reduced for a time 
to the strict defensive. ' ' On the same day he wrote 
to General Butler (No. 28), ordering him, "without 
waiting to hear from General Taylor," to send to 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 23 

the Brazos for embarkation to Vera Cruz about 
9,000 men. Notwithstanding General Taylor had 
only a week before placed himself and troops at 
the disposition of General Scott, and Scott was his 
superior officer, General Taylor declared he was 
"mortified and outraged" at his interference with 
his command, and strongly resented it in a letter to 
General Scott, dated January 15, 1847 (No. 31). 
He complained that he had been kept in ignorance 
of the designs of the Government, and had evi- 
dently lost its confidence, and he would have been 
much better satisfied had he been relieved of com- 
mand or allowed to retire from the field; and the 
expectation which seemed to be entertained that 
he could assume offensive operations by March or 
even May was "preposterous." Even to hold a 
defensive line he had less than a thousand regulars 
and a volunteer force mostly of new levies, while 
an army of more than 20,000 men was in his front. 
He did not say he could not hold the defensive 
line. On the contrary, in a letter written some 
days later, January 27th (No. 33), to the Adjutant 
General, with instructions to submit it to the Sec- 
retary of War, to be by him laid before the Presi- 
dent, he said: "The force with which I am left in 
this quarter, though greatly deficient in regular 
troops, will doubtless enable me to hold the posi- 
tion now occupied." 

The sum of the matter is, that whereas Scott 
was directed to leave Taylor enough troops to de- 



24 - The Myth in Chrysalis. 

fend him behind the walls of Monterey, which was 
the most advanced position he was expected or de- 
sired to maintain, he in fact left him strong enough 
to meet the enemy in the open field, fifty miles in 
advance of that position, and to gain a great and 
decisive victory. 

At a later period, in April, 1847, reinforcements 
were to be sent forward to Scott to enable him to 
advance upon Mexico. They were by previous 
arrangement sent to the Brazos, a point within the 
limits of his command, and there came under his 
orders. In the instructions given by General Scott, 
April 25th (No. 39), to the commanding officer 
there, to forward them on to Vera Cruz, he made it 
"conditional on the safety of the line of the Rio 
Grande," and left it to his " own sound judgment 
to determine on the spot" whether that line would 
be too much exposed by the withdrawal of the 
troops in question. 

On the whole, I conclude that General Scott was 
as little desirous to expose Taylor to slaughter and 
defeat as the President and Secretary were that he 
should do so. 



I pass now to the second branch of the subject — 
the treatment of General Scott by the Administra- 
tion. 

It is charged that the President and Secretary of 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 25 

War, in pursuance of a plan to disgrace General 
Scott, withheld one-half of the men and munitions 
of war which he had estimated to be necessary for 
the success of his expedition, and which they had 
promised him with expressions of "sincere good 
wishes." And the charge is repeated in connection 
with the expedition to Vera Cruz, for which, it is 
said, Scott had less than 12,000 men when he was 
promised a much larger force. 

The only estimates of troops ever made by Gen- 
eral Scott were in his four memoirs of October 27th 
and November 12th, 16th, and 21st (Nos. 13, 15, 16, 
and 17). In these he stated that ' ' to place the capture 
of both places beyond the probability of a failure " 
(both places, the city and castle) "an army of at 
least 10,000 men" was indispensable. Personally 
he would be willing to attempt it with a smaller 
army, but doubted whether the Government ought 
to risk it with less than 12,000, perhaps 15,000 men. 
In the instructions hereinbefore referred to, which 
he drafted and proposed the Secretary should give 
him (No. 18), the Secretary was to tell him that 
though he (Scott) thought 15,000 not an unreason- 
able number of troops for the expedition, and 10,000 
the minimum, "you are yet of opinion that the 
expedition ought to go forward even with the first 
8,000 men that may be embarked off Point Isabel, 
sooner than incur the danger of losing your men 
and object by the yellow fever in consequence of 



26 The Myfh in Chrysalis. 

waiting too long for either of the larger numbers 
you have mentioned." The Secretary declined to 
give the instructions asked or to name any force 
whatever, but, as we shall presently see, left it to 
Scott himself to decide what force he could take 
from Taylor, and what he should take. 

And in the first letter he wrote Taylor after 
reaching New Orleans, dated December 20th (No. 
22), General Scott said that while 15,000 men were 
desirable, I " am now inclined to move forward to 
the attack should I be able to assemble the 5,000 
regulars, and, say, three of volunteers." We have 
seen that Taylor thought the city alone might 
possibly be taken by 4,000 men. Scott, from his 
draft of 23d November, and his letter of 20th De- 
cember, appears to have determined to make the 
attempt if he could get no more than 8,000 men. 
And in these calculations he expected to encounter 
20,000 or 30,000 men on landing at Vera Cruz, or 
even double that number if Mexico could arm so 
many; and to land, "no doubt, under heavy fire" 
(No. 15). 

In the instructions which he drafted for the Secre- 
tary to give him, he was to be directed to organize 
an expedition against Vera Cruz, and to make up 
the expeditionary force from the army of General 
Taylor and from nine regiments of volunteers which 
had recently been called for, but had not yet been 
organized. The Secretary declined to give him 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 27 

such unconditional orders. In the instructions 
which he did give (No. 19) he directed Scott to 
organize the expedition, u if on arriving at the 
theatre of action you shall deem it to be practi- 
cable. It is not proposed (he continues) to control 
your operations by definite and positive instruc- 
tions, but you are left to prosecute them as your 
judgment, under a full view of all the circum- 
stances, shall dictate." And finally, he hoped Gen- 
eral Scott would have the requisite force to accom- 
plish the objects in view, but " of this you must 
be the judge when preparations are made, and the 
time for action has arrived. ' ' 

The sources of supply stated in the draft of in- 
structions were the nine new regiments of volun- 
teers and Taylor's army in the field, which last by 
his seniority of rank and his assignment to command 
became absolutely his own, whether he went on to 
Vera Cruz or not. The volunteers he thought might 
begin to arrive "off Point Isabel say about the 
middle of January." "Such (he makes the Secre- 
tary say to him) are your own (Scott's) calcula- 
tions." Thus, then, a large army was actually 
given him, and a force had been called for in addi- 
tion, which he, knowing perhaps better than the 
Secretary, the process of organizing volunteers 
calculated would be with him in January. He ex- 
pected to take from the two, 14,000 men, as stated 
in his memoir of November 16th (No. 16), and he 



28 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

still expected so man)- when he reached New Or- 
leans; for he wrote General Butler to send him from 
Taylor's army 9,100 men, and he expressed his in- 
tention elsewhere to take five regiments, say 5,000 
men of the new volunteers; but for reasons which 
I do not find stated, the whole, when assembled, 
amounted not to 14,000, but only to 12,000 men, 
and with these he proceeded to Vera Cruz, landing 
with no enemy to oppose him, and without hearing 
a hostile shot except from the castle, and he, of 
course, took care to land far beyond the range of 
its guns. 

General Grant says Captain Alburtis was killed 
in landing. General Scott in his dispatch of 
March 12th says the landing was effected "without 
accident or loss," and that Alburtis and many oth- 
ers weie killed two days after "in extending the 
line of investments around the city." 



It is manifest, from the circumstances and con- 
ditions of the case, that it is impossible that Gen- 
eral Scott could have had the promise of any troops 
whatever. He was given the actual command of 
all the troops in service, and as to the volunteers 
all the President could do was to call for them, 
which he certainly had done before Scott was 
assigned to command, and the orders for sending 
them forward were given by General Scott himself 
(No. 24). And then, in all the correspondence be- 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 29 

tween Scott and the Department, we look in vain for 
any reference, either by Scott or the Secretary, to any 
promise by the Department of troops, or, indeed, 
of anything else. In his draft of instructions Gen- 
eral Scott speaks of what he had recommended, but 
never of what the President had promised. And 
what is conclusive is this: During the campaign in 
Mexico he got into difficulties with his subordi- 
nates, and, as the President would not court-martial 
them, he asked to be relieved; and after the city 
was taken and the enemy subdued he was relieved. 
This and some other things stung him to frenzy, 
and he sat down and drew a long indictment against 
the Department (No. 43), which I shall have occa- 
sion to review at length, charging the Secretary 
with numerous manifestations of hostility to him, 
and sundry neglects and disappointments; but 
never once did he say that the Secretary had 
made or had broken a promise. The only place in 
that long letter where the word " promised " is 
used is in a misquotation from one of his own let- 
ters, in which the actual word was "informed." 

As for troops for subsequent operations, it is 
sufficient to say that the largest number ever esti- 
mated by General Taylor for the campaign against 
the capital was 25,000, aud the largest number 
ever named by General Scott in his various memoirs 
or elsewhere was 20,000, and though with his usual 
caution he added that more might be needed, he 



30 The Myfh in Chrysalis. 

named no greater number. Now, he must have 
had in all 36,000 or 37,000 men; for he had in 
November, 1847, 32,156 men, as stated in the Adju- 
tant General's report and the annual report of the 
Secretary of War at the next session (Nos. 51, 50), 
and he had lost many men in battle, and had dis- 
charged at least 3,700 volunteers after reaching the 
interior (No. 50). So that as regards men, it is 
simply impossible that the President and Secretary 
could have ever made any promises to General Scott 
that were not fulfilled, or any promises at all, or 
that General Scott ever could have said they did ; 
and finally it is certain that they gave him nearly 
twice as many men as he had ever asked for. 



I have had occasion to say that General Scott did, 
in fact, make certain charges against the President 
and Secretary, and I must add that these charges 
were somewhat of the nature of those which Gen- 
eral Grant has repeated (No. 43). In all essential 
features, however, they were false, and their falsity 
was exposed in an immediate reply by the Secre- 
tary of War (No. 44). General Scott's letter and 
Governor Marcy's reply were printed by Congress 
in the same document (Doc. 59, H. R., 1847-8), 
and I think I may say that only very careless read- 
ing or wilful blindness could fail to see that the 
refutation was perfect. The friends of General 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 31 

Scott had been content for thirty years to let his 
mistake lie in the quiet obscurity of a Congres- 
sional document, and his political opponents, mind- 
ful of his great services to his country, have 
felt no disposition to disturb its rest. But to 
the politician the individual is as nought in com- 
parison with the party, and the soldier is accus- 
tomed to sacrifice friends that foes may perish with 
them. And there is abundant evidence in the 
"Personal Memoirs" that General Grant cared 
nothing for General Scott, besides the disservice he 
has done him in producing him as a witness against 
Governor Marcy, and most unjustifiably making 
the issue that either Scott lied or Marcy was a 
traitor; for that, in plain words, is just as General 
Grant puts it. I hope to show that he has not the 
authority of General Scott for any such position. 
The internal evidence is conclusive that General 
Grant's authority for what Scott said is derived 
exclusively from Scott's published dispatches, and 
particularly from the accusatory letter above re- 
ferred to, and in disposing of the charges made in 
that letter I dispose of those made by General 
Grant on General Scott's alleged authority. But 
it is a matter of sincere regret to me that this 
scheme of defence renders inevitable the exposure 
of some of the errors and weaknesses of General 
Scott, who, in spite of glaring faults, had some 
great and many estimable qualities. 



32 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

General Scott, in conduct and conversation, was 
as pure as a woman, and strangely enough, great 
soldier as he certainly was, his weaknesses were 
distinctively feminine. His pride in his fine figure 
was manifested only too often. His fondness for 
display and finery have been shown up in the 
Personal Memoirs,* and his dispatches contain ex- 
amples of an aimless querulousness, not perhaps 
elsewhere to be found in masculine correspondence. 
In his reports he bewails the delays and mishaps due 
to the elements on a stormy coast and in a stormy 
season, and disclaims his responsibility for them in 
a tone that suggests .the responsibility must rest 
somewhere. And so in his accusatory letter he com- 
plains that only so many supplies came, implying, 
but not at all asserting, that others ought to have 
come. It is these incomplete complaints that have 
misled General Grant's eager credulity, and he has 
formulated them in the shape which he would fain 
make us believe General Scott intended to give them ; 
that is, that what mishaps General Scott met with, 
the Administration had undertaken to avert, and had 
wilfully failed to do so; and what he failed to re- 
ceive, the Administration had undertaken to supply, 
and had purposely withheld. 

*Tiiis is done with a touch of humor, notwithstanding Gen- 
eral Grant's Scotch blood. And there is, too, a spice of sarcasm 
in his apophthegm, that nothing so popularizes a candidate for 
high civil position as military victories. 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 33 

There were four, and only four, complaints in 
that letter having any reference to ' ' men and ma- 
terial. ' ' Two of them are contained in the following 
paragraph : 

"The embarkation was delayed in whole or in 
part from the 15th of January to the 9th of March, 
leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed for 
the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castle before the 
return of the yellow fever. But half the surf-boats 
came at all, and of the siege train and ordnance 
stores only about one-half had arrived [at Vera 
Cruz] when the Mexican flags were replaced by 
thpse of the United States on those formidable 
places [the city and castle]. We succeeded at last 
in reaching the point of attack in the midst of 
frightful northers, by means in great part of trading 
craft, small and hazardous, picked up accidently at 
the Brazos and Tampico, and when the army got 
ashore its science and valor had to supply all de- 
ficiencies in heavy guns, mortars, and ordnance 
stores ' ' (No. 43). 

This paragraph contains the only mention made 
in the letter of surf boats, siege train, and ordnance 
stores, and the letter nowhere indicates how many 
or much ought to have arrived, or who was re- 
sponsible for their failure to arrive. But as the 
whole letter is devoted to an arraignment of the 
Administration, the casual reader would understand 
that the failure was to be imputed to the War De- 
partment; yet General Scott, while certainly willing 
to be so understood, does not say so ; and it is left 



34 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

for General Grant to boldly interpret it into a: 
allegation that the Secretary had promised him 
certain supply of guns and ordnance stores, an 
furnished only half. 

Now, as it turned out, the surf boats, which wer 
constructed at a cost of $130,000, solely for the pur- 
pose of landing the army at Vera Cruz on the singlt 
occasion, were not needed at all ; and of the siege 
train and ordnance stores twice as many mortan 
and twenty times as many shells reached him a] 
Vera Cruz before the surrender as he had occasion 
to use. He was enabled to complain, with truth, 
that only about half had been received by having 
asked for five times as many guns and forty times 
as many shells as were needed, and twice as many 
of both as could possibly be made and delivered in 
time to be of use. 

But to be more specific, General Scott expected 
that on arriving at Vera Cruz he would find a 
Mexican army of at least 25,000 men ready to 
oppose his landing (No. 15.) He therefore asked 
for 140 surf boats, so that he could put ashore at a 
single instant 5,000 men, who, under cover of the 
fire of the fleet, could make good their footing on 
land. These boats he thought would cost $200 
apiece; in fact they cost $960 (No. 44). And they 
were all promptly forwarded to him, for he men- 
tions in a letter of February 28 (No. 36), that 
General Jones, the Adjutant General, had written 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 35 

him that all had been shipped. But, as I have 
said, no surf boats were needed at all, because 
there was no enemy on the beach, or within a hun- 
dred miles of the beach, except the small garrison 
of Vera Cruz, who wisely kept within their walls. 
The whole army could have been landed in the 
boats of the fleet. But General Scott took no 
risks. 

As regards the siege train and ordnance stores, it 
was General Scott's business to order them, and he 
said, on the 16th of November, that he would do 
so on that day (No. 16), and he ordered 50 large 
mortars and 4,000 tons — say eighty or one hundred 
thousand — shells (No. 44). When the Chief of Ord- 
nance received this requisition he at once pro- 
nounced it "preposterous." The shells, he said, 
were enough to bury Vera Cruz in iron, and he 
knew the vast order could not be filled in time. 
Nevertheless, as was his duty, he submitted it to 
the Secretary, and the Secretary ordered that it be 
complied with " as far as practicable" (No. 44). 
: All the mortars were made and shipped, and 67,000 
shells, as shown by the report of the Ordnance De- 
partment accompanying the President's annual 
message of December, 1847. General Scott says 
about half were received. Half would be 25 mor- 
tars and at least 40,000 shells ; but his report from 
Vera Cruz (No. 45) shows that only 23 mortars 
reached him, and there must have been, if not 



36 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

40,000, then 30,000, shells. That all did not reach 
him the Secretary attributed to the fact that at that 
day the iron foundries depended for their heavy 
freighting upon the rivers and other water-ways of 
the interior, and these, in the dead of winter, were 
frozen (No. 44). But 23 mortars and at least 30,000 
shells reached Vera Cruz in time for the siege (No. 

45)- 

As soon as ten of these mortars were placed in 

battery, the firing upon the city began, and these 
ten mortars, with the aid of two batteries of 24- 
pounders — one of these constructed, armed, and 
worked by the sailors of the fleet — accomplished 
the capture of Vera Cruz and its castle (Nos. 45 
and 46). And these several batteries threw alto- 
gether 2,500 solid shot and shells (No. 46); so that 
if the mortars were fired as rapidly as the guns 
(which they were not), the ten mortars would have 
thrown 1,140 shells, and the twelve other guns 
1,360 solid shot. And the conclusion is that Gen- 
eral Scott, in asking for 50 mortars and 80,000 shells, 
asked for five times as many mortars and seventy 
times as many shells as he found need for. And 
when he said the science and valor of the army 
" had to supply all deficiencies in heavy guns, mor- 
tars, and ordnance stores," he actually had on hand 
twice as many mortars and thirty times as many 
shells, and probably six times as many heavy guns, 
as he found use for. As to the heavy guns, indeed 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 37 

the information is not so specific. Forty-four were 
issued according to the ordnance report above quoted, 
and he must have asked for them, but he had only 
six in battery. He never complained that any had 
failed to reach him. The other 38 may have been 
lying on the beach with the unused mortars, while 
valor and skill supplied their place. 



Another charge, to which great prominence is 
given in the letter of complaint, is that ten trans- 
ports, which General Scott had requested to have 
sent out in ballast from Atlantic ports, to carry 
troops from the Brazos and Tampico to Vera Cruz, 
and which the Secretary had ordered to be so sent, 
never came. u Relying upon them, confidently, 
(he says in No. 43), the embarkation was delayed 
in whole or in part at the Brazos and Tampico 
from the 15th of January to the 9th of March, 
leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed 
for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castle before 
the return of the yellow fever." (No. 43.) The 
order had indeed been given, and the vessels never 
came ! but why ? 

" Forseeing at Washington (he says in No. 43) 
that from the great demands of commerce at the 
moment, it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to take up, perhaps at any price, a sufficient num- 
ber of vessels at New Orleans and Mobile to 



38 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

transport the regiments of my expedition from 
the Rio Grande frontier to Vera Cruz," he had 
made the request, and the order was given. But 
General Scott at Washington was not in a position 
to know as well as the Quartermaster General at 
New Orleans, what vessels could be had at the latter 
point. He had himself advised that the ships "be 
not chartered until the troops are known to be 
nearly in position to embark" (No. 16), and the 
Secretary, while out of abundant caution, giving 
the order December 15th, had previously (Decem- 
ber nth) written to General Jesup at New Orleans 
to know whether it would be necessary to send out 
vessels in ballast, which he said would be enor- 
mously expensive. 

When this letter reached New Orleans, General 
Scott was there, and saw and read it; and in a letter 
to the Secretary (No. 23) so informed him, and re- 
marked upon certain matters concerning transpor- 
tation. General Jesup replied (No. 26): "Trans- 
portation can be provided here for all the troops 
that may be drawn from the army under the com- 
mand of General Taylor. * * * The public 
transports * * * it is estimated, will carry 3,000 
men with all their supplies. Vessels can be char- 
tered here on favorable terms for any additional 
transportation that may be required." General 
Scott saw this letter before it was sent, and marked 
on it " read," and noted his concurrence in certain 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 39 

recommendations made on another subject. On 
receipt of this letter by the Secretary, he, of course, 
countermanded his order to send vessels around to 
New Orleans in ballast. On the 26th of January, 
when, according to his letter of complaint, he had 
been waiting eleven days — since the 15th — for the 
ten vessels, General Scott wrote to the Secretary 
(No. 32): "The Quartermaster General (Brevet 
Major General Jesup) at New Orleans has, I find, 
taken all proper measures, with judgment and 
promptitude, to provide everything depending on 
his department for the dispatch and success of my 
expedition. Transports, casks filled with water, 
&c, &c, are accordingly expected to arrive here 
[the Brazos] and off Tampico before the 7th of the 
next month. ' ' Not a word is said of the ten vessels, 
and no mention is made of any delay. 

On the 29th General Scott wrote to General Pat- 
terson at Tampico (No. 34) : " Transports have been 
taken up at New Orleans for all the troops who 
are to compose my expedition, and embark here 
[Brazos] and at Tampico. ' ' 

On the 1 2th of January (No. 30) he had written 
to General Brooke, in command at New Orleans, 
that the troops who were to embark at Brazos and 
Tampico would not ' ' reach those points till late 
in the present month — say about the 25th." In 
the same letter he directed General Brooke to take 
particular care in causing all ships which were to 



40 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

join him to be provided with fuel and water for 
sixty or ninety days. "The water of the Rio 
Grande [he added] is not good for drinking, and 
there would be great difficulty in obtaining it. 
Spare casks of Mississippi water on board ships 
without troops may be easily shifted to the trans- 
ports with men and horses." 

If there was any delay, some of it was due to this 
order. For on February ist he wrote from Brazos 
to Captain Saunders, of the Navy (No. 35): "I may 
be detained here several days longer waiting for 
the transports to receive the troops in this neighbor- 
hood and at Tampico, and those ships I know are 
detained at New Orleans, waiting for water casks, 
in the hands of coopers." This is all that he says 
about the detention or the cause of it. But how 
utterly impossible it renders his allegation that he 
delayed the embarkation waiting for the ten vessels 
to arrive. 

But this is not all. The delay is said to have 
extended from the 15th of January to the 9th of 
March. Now, I have quoted above, from his letter 
of 1 2 th January, that the troops to embark at 
Brazos and Tampico were not expected to reach 
those points before the 25th, and other reports show 
that they did not. Then, on the 9th of March, 
when they are said to have embarked at Brazos, 
the whole army landed at Vera Cruz. When they 
embarked I cannot state, nor is it material, but be- 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 41 

fore the 9th of March they had crossed the Gulf of 
Mexico, in sailing vessels, "in the midst of fright- 
ful northers," and had in the meantime rendez- 
voused at Iyobos. General Grant says the voyage 
was tedious, and "many of the troops were on 
shipboard thirty days." So it is certain they did 
not land at Vera Cruz on the same day they left 
Brazos. 



I have already said that in none of General Scott's 
letters, not even in that devoted to an enumeration 
of "the neglects, disappointments, injuries, and 
rebukes which [had] been inflicted" upon him by 
the War Department (No. 43), is it alleged that any 
troops had been promised him by the War Depart- 
ment; still less that he did not receive all that he 
expected. He did, however, complain that certain 
troops under General Cadwallader, which he had 
expected to be sent to Vera Cruz, had been sent to 
Brazos, and that the want of them had crippled his 
operations. To this Governor Marcy replied that 
he had given no orders on the subject; that before 
General Scott left for Mexico he had himself 
arranged that all the troops sent to him should 
report at the Brazos, which place was within 
the limits of his command, and it was in pur- 
suance of that arrangement that they were sent 
thither. It is true that in advising General Scott 



42 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

of their departure for that point (No. 37), the Sec- 
retary had spoken of the reports of General Taylor's 
critical position, and the succor which the troops 
would be in a position to afford him; for though 
this was a month after the battle of Buena Vista, 
intelligence of it had not reached Washington. 
General Scott, in acknowledging the receipt of this 
letter (No. 40), took no exception to what he after- 
wards called the "diversion" of those troops; and, 
in ordering them on to Vera Cruz, he made the 
order conditional upon their not being needed by 
General Taylor. A year later, when he was seek- 
ing subjects of complaint, this diversion, the effect 
solely of his own orders, was made to play a most 
important part. He said a soldier [only] could 
imagine his distress on hearing these troops had 
been diverted to the Rio Grande, for had General 
Cadwallader not been so delayed, he believed he 
could have taken Mexico in June at one-fifth the 
loss he afterwards sustained in August (No. 43). I 
have no doubt he could have done so, and that his 
loss would have been, not a fifth, but only a twenty- 
fifth of what he sustained in August. And not 
only this, but it is certain that without General 
Cadwallader' s troops he could have done the same. 
For after he had heard in April that General Cad- 
wallader' s troops were at the Brazos, and after he 
had ordered that officer to remain there if he should 
find it necessary (No. 39), General Scott discharged 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 43 

and sent home 3, 700 veteran volunteers who had 
yet from four to seven weeks to serve, twice the 
time that, three months later, proved necessary for 
the taking of the city (No. 47). 

And now to the proof of this: 

On the 23d of April he wrote to Colonel Wilson 
at Vera Cruz (No. 38): "We already occupy Perote 
and shall soon occupy Puebla. Indeed, zve might 
safely take possession of Mexico without a loss, per- 
haps, of one hundred men. Our dangers and diffi- 
culties are the rear." Santa Anna was eighty 
miles in the rear of Scott, who was between him 
and the Capital, and he was "without arms, maga- 
zines or military chest" (No. 40). The Govern- 
ment was preparing to leave the city (No. 39). But 
having sent home the volunteers, Scott sat down 
at Puebla for three months, while Santa Anna 
made his way to the Capital, and, as General Scott 
says, u had time to collect, to treble, to organize 
and discipline his forces, and also to erect numerous 
and powerful defences, with batteries" (No. 43). 
So that, instead of 100 men, he lost 2,703 in taking 
the city. 

Let me make this still plainer. After Santa 
Anna had been allowed three months to make his 
way to the Capital and fortify it in the maimer 
stated, General Scott, resumed the offensive on 
the 7th of August, fought several battles, and had 
the city at his mercy on the 20th. In his despatch 



44 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

of August 28th, giving an account of a series of 
battles fought on the 20th, and several victories won 
on that day, he says : "After so many victories, we 
might, with little additional loss, have occupied 
the Capital the same evening." But he granted an 
armistice. Now the force with which he achieved 
the victories in August was 10,738 men (No. 49). 
The force which he had under his command in 
May, before he discharged the volunteers, must 
have been 9,000 men.* It is obvious that Santa 
Anna's 30,000 men and fortifications far more than 
counterbalanced the few hundreds by which General 
Scott had increased his force, and that he would 
have found it far easier to take the city in May, with 
9,000 men (which he said he could do with the loss 
of 100 men), than he found it in August with 10,738 
men, when his actual loss was 2,703 men, and he 
could have done it quicker. Or, if no quicker, he 
could have done it in fourteen days, the time 
actually required, while the volunteers had twenty- 
eight days or longer to serve. 

Why he discharged the volunteers thus in ad- 
vance of the expiration of their term, perhaps 
only a soldier can understand; but a politician 
might be pardoned for suspecting that Scott, who 
' ' was known to have political aspirations, ' ' might 
hope for the votes of men whom he thus released 

* General Grant says nine or ten thousand (p. 135). 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 45 

from an arduous and dangerous service. The rea- 
son he gave, that none of them would re-engage, 
and that, if retained to the end of their terms, 
they would have to pass through Vera Cruz during 
the yellow fever season, may be true, but he could 
have taken Mexico by the 20th of May (6+14=20), 
and the volunteers could have reached Vera Cruz 
considerably in advance of the yellow fever, which 
ordinarily arrives in June. 



The rest of the complaints in the accusatory 
letter refer mostly to the refusals of the President 
to appoint or promote officers whom he had recom- 
mended, and to court-martial others, of whom he 
had complained. But as these and a few others 
do not concern the question of reinforcements and 
supplies, I shall not report the replies which Gov- 
ernor Marcy made to them. There are, however, 
two circumstances which shed such light upon the 
character of the testimony which General Grant 
has adduced against Governor Marcy, that the de- 
fence would be incomplete without noticing them 
both. 

In his letter of accusation General Scott says: 

u Only four days were allowed me at Washing- 
ton, where twenty might have been most advan- 
tageously employed in the great bureaus, those of 
the Chief Engineer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief 



46 The MytH i)i Chrysalis. 

Quartermaster, and Chief Commissary of Subsist- 
ence." (No. 43.) 

For answer to this, Governor Marcy quietly quoted 
a paragraph from the draft of instructions which 
Scott had requested the Secretary to address to 
him (No. 18). In this draft Scott desires the Sec- 
retary to say to him : 

" I am pleased to learn from you that you have, 
in a very few days, already, through the general 
staff of the army here, laid a sufficient basis for the 
purposes with which you are charged, and that you 
now think it best to proceed at once to the south- 
west, in order to organize the largest number of 
troops that can be obtained in time for that most 
important expedition." 

Thus, having applied in writing for orders to pro- 
ceed to the front, and assigned as a reason that he 
had done all that was necessary at Washington, 
General Scott, in less than fifteen months thereafter, 
complained, also in writing, that he had not been 
allowed time in Washington to complete his prepar- 
ations. 



The remaining incident had perhaps a more un- 
fortunate effect upon General Scott's military oper- 
ations than any that I have mentioned, and yet it is 
not alluded to in his accusatory letter. 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 47 

The President, in April, 1847, sent to Mexico Mr. 
N. P. Trist, chief clerk of the State Department, 
bearing a sealed dispatch addressed to the Mexican 

Minister of Foreign Relations, and an order fronf 

the War Department directing General Scott to 
have this despatch forwarded to its address by flag 
of truce. Mr. Trist was also entrusted with a copy 
of the sealed despatch, and a copy of the treaty which 
it was the purpose of that despatch to propose to the 
Mexican Government, and which, if accepted and 
duly ratified by Mexico, was to be followed by a 
suspension of hostilities. Mr. Trist was instructed 
to exhibit these copies to General Scott, and when 
the reply of the Mexican Government should be re- 
ceived, accepting and ratifying the treaty, to give 
General Scott information to that effect, in order 
that he might suspend hostilities, until the treaty 
could be submitted to the Senate for ratification on 
the part of the United States. (No. 42.) 

On reaching Vera Cruz, Mr. Trist found an op- 
portunity to forward the despatch and the order to 
General Scott, who was at Jalapa, and he followed 
on soon after. And there he received back from 
General Scott the sealed packet intended for the 
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a letter 
in which General Scott positively refused to for- 
ward it, for sundry reasons, of which not the least po- 
tent was probably this : u I see [wrote General Scott 
No. 41] that the Secretary of War proposes to de- 



48 The Myth in Chrysalis. 

grade me by requiring that I, the Commander of 
this Army, shall defer to you, the chief clerk of the 
State Department, the question of continuing or 
discontinuing hostilities." And he claimed that 
"armistice or no armistice is most peculiarly a mili- 
tary question," and that if the enemy should enter- 
tain the overtures, that question should be referred 
to him. 

Accordingly, when ready, he advanced upon the 
City of Mexico, and after a succession of battles, 
fought on the 20th of August, in all which he was 
victorious, he granted the enemy an armistice with 
a view to negotiate a peace. u After so many vic- 
tories [writes General Scott, No. 48] we might, with 
but little additional loss, have occupied the Capital 
the same evening. But Mr. Trist, commissioner, 
&c, as well as myself, had been admonished by 
the best friends of peace, ' ' not to drive away the gov- 
ernment, and, by taking the Capital, excite a spirit 
of national desperation; and so he granted a military 
armistice, of which the Mexicans availed themselves 
with such diligence that when hostilities were re- 
sumed it cost General Scott a loss of 1,651 men be- 
fore he could enter the city. The instructions of 
the War Department were that hostilities should 
cease only after negotiations should have been 
brought to an end by the acceptance by Mexico 
of the terms offered, and by the ratification by 
Mexico of a treaty embodying them, whereas Gen- 



The Myth in Chrysalis. 49 

eral Scott granted an armistice in order to enter 
upon negotiations, with the result that the negoti- 
ations were availed of by the Mexicans only to 
amuse the Americans, and cost them the heavy 
loss I have stated. 

The reader will probably be surprised that Gen- 
eral Scott adduced the authority of Mr. Trist on 
the u peculiarly military question " of armistice. I 
must, therefore, mention that after a correspond- 
ence, quite as acrid on Mr. Trist' s part as on 
General Scott's, the "chief clerk of the Depart- 
ment of State ' ' and c ' the Commander of this 
Army" had suddenly conceived the highest admi- 
ration for each other, and become fast friends. * 

* This correspondence is a curiosity of literature. The writers 
contend which shall say the bitterest things, a,nd each in his 
own proper style. The soldier is blunt and abusive ; the diplo- 
mat smooth and sarcastic. Scott was tempted to return Trist's 
"farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance" to the writer, 
who, if he had "but an ambulatory guillotine, would be the 
personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just all in one." Trist 
acknowledged "the amiable affability and gracious condescen- 
sion" of Scott, whose "outward acts of respect for the Govern- 
ment" [he said] "bear the same relation to this sentiment 
which genuflections and upturnings of the eyes bear to reli- 
gion." (Doc. 60, pp. 813-25, 996.) 



50 The Evolution of the Myth. 



Thk Evolution of the Myth. 

The evolution of the myth from the facts which 
constituted its chrysalis condition was effected 
solely by General Grant's imagination, aided, per- 
haps, somewhat by his logical faculty. If General 
Scott had received one-half the siege trains and 
ordnance stores, reason suggested there must have 
been a whole, and imagination added that the 
whole was the quantity promised. And when 
reason suggested there must have been a motive 
for withholding the half, imagination added that 
the motive was to disgrace Scott lest he should 
by success win a reputation that would render him 
a formidable rival for the Presidency. And in 
this way, and in this way only, is constructed 
against President Polk and his Secretary of War 
the charge of a crime exceeding in atrocity, I 
verily believe, any that history records — the crime, 
namely, of sending ten thousand men to death by 
pestilence and hostile arms, in order that their com- 
mander might be disgraced by the failure of the 
enterprise in which they were engaged. 

Wisely did the great moralist of the last century 
and of our age say : "Among the calamities of 
war must be reckoned the diminution of a regard 
for truth." And the reason is not far to seek. 
The necessity of deceiving one's enemies and, 



Conclusion. 51 

almost as often, one's friends, and the habit of look- 
ing for success only to force and stratagem, and never 
to justice or reason ; in short the fundamental con- 
viction of the soldier that on whichever side may 
be the right, ' ' Heaven is always on the side of 
the heaviest artillery, " must depreciate the war- 
rior's estimate of the value of truth, deaden his 
faculty of apprehending it, and render him in- 
sensible to the necessity of taking it into account 
as an element in the consideration of any subject. 

Conclusion. 

I feel that I have successfully achieved my task, 
and no one who reads these pages with a mind 
open to conviction will credit the charges made by 
General Grant against President Polk and Secretary 
Marcy. But this defence will not reach one in a 
million of those who will read the charges. Speedy 
oblivion will settle on this humble vindication, 
while the great libel will take its place as a true 
chapter in the History of the United States. 

General Grant's sarcasm is as true as it is bitter. 
The people honor the warrior who has triumphed 
in fields of slaughter, though at home and in civil 
war, more than the statesman who has rescued half 
a continent from the dominion of superstition and 
savagery, and given it to enlightened freedom and 
peaceful industry. 



52 References. 



References. 

The following letters and reports are found in 

document No. 60, House of Representatives, 30th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1847-8: 

No. 1846 Page 

1 Secretary Marcy May 30. 283 

2 Same June 8. 323 

3 General Scott June 12. 325 

4 General Taylor July 2. 329 

5 Secretary Marcy July 9. 333 

6 General Taylor Aug. 1. 336 

7 Secretary Marcy Sept. 2. 339 

8 General Scott Sept. 12. 372 

9 Secretary Marcy Sept. 22. 341 

10 General Taylor Oct. 13. 350 

11 Same Oct. 15. 351 

12 Secretary Marcy Oct. 22. 363 

13 General Scott Oct. 27. 1268 

14 General Taylor Nov. 12. 374 

15 General Scott Nov. 12. 1270 

16 Same Nov. 16. 1273 

17 Same Nov. 21. 1274 

18 Same Nov. 23. 1275 

19 Secretary Marcy Nov. 2^ 836 



References. 53 

1846 Page 

20 General Scott Nov. 25. 373 

21 General Taylor Dec. 14. 381 

22 General Scott Dec. 20. 839 

23 Same Dec. 27. 838 

24 Same Dec. 23. 841 

25 General Taylor Dec. 26. 848 

26 General Jesup Dec. 27. 568 

1847 

27 General Scott Jan. 3. 848 

28 Same Jan. 3. 851 

29 Secretary Marcy Jan. 4. 871 

30 General Scott ...Jan. 12. 855 

31 General Taylor Jan. 15. 862 

32 General Scott Jan. 26. 865 

33 General Taylor Jan. 27. 1100 

34 General Scott Jan. 29. 880 

35 Same Feb. 1. 882 

36 Same Feb. 28. 896 

37 Secretary Marcy , Mar 22. 906 

38 General Scott Apl. 23. 946 

39 Same Apl. 25. 950 

40 Same Apl. 28. 944 

41 Same May 7. 814 

42 Secretary Marcy May 31. 960 

1848 

45 General Scott Feb. 24. 1218 

44 Secretary Marcy Apl. 21. 1227 



54 References. 

The following reports are found in document No. 
8, House of Representatives, Thirtieth Congress, 
First Session, 1847-8. President's Annual Message. 

No. 1847 

45 General Scott Mar. 23. 

46 General Bankhead Mar. 28. 

47 General Scott April 23. 

48 Same Aug. 28. 

49 Same Sept. 18. 

50 Secretary Marcy Dec. 2. 

5 1 Adjutant-General Nov. 

52 Col. Ordnance Nov. 



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